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The tearful, thirtysomething woman walked to the front of the stage set
in Hollywood's Moulin Rouge and struggled to tell her story. The
unctuous master of ceremonies, alternately jocular and sympathetic,
coaxed the account from her, prompting her with factual details: she'd
been drifting for the past six months; her husband had died; she was
raising two of the "sweetest girls";- she needed a job, preferably as a
switchboard operator; she hoped for advice on how to be the mother...
(the emcee filled in the sentence she could not complete)... "she wanted
to be." The host assured her that she seemed to be an "awfully good
mother," who had endured the "bad luck," the "terrible thing," of losing
her husband.'
This exchange between avuncular emcee and dutiful mother was
endlessly repeated from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s on Queen for
A Day, a popular daytime television program. Dubbed the "Cinderella
show," it offered a window into the quotidian experience of women who,
in the aftermath of World War II, struggled to find a place for them-
selves and their families in an expanding middle class.2 In these
broadcasts, a succession of luckless women told their stories and made
their requests for washing machines, food, clothing, and help in locating
lost family members. Virtually all of the women who would be queen
were married with children; the women whose appeals were most likely
to receive consideration were those thought to be exemplars of "good"
mothers or whose altruistic requests on behalf of a disabled parent-in-
law, or the patients of a tuberculosis sanatorium, were in accord with
the program's ideal of good mothering.
• Associate Professor of Law,City University of New York School of Law.
Queen for a Day. Host John Bailey. NBC, March or April,1956. Unless otherwise
noted, all discussions of individual programs are based on viewing the video archives at
the Museum of Television and Radio (MTR) in New York City.
2 Although females who reigned as queen ranged in ages from ninety-five to eight
months, a study by UCLA sociologist Franklin Fearing indicated that the "typical" queen
was a 29-year-old housewife who had at least one child and a "high school or college
background." MTR Clippings File, ABC News Release, April 13, 1964.
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Trading on the plight of these women, Queen for a Day offered a
momentary spotlight and respite from care. For a contestant who had
survived the program's vetting process, Queen for a Day also presented
the chance to win an array of consumables that, it was presumed, would
relieve some of the oppressive circumstances that brought her to the
program. The winning candidate was determined by an applause meter
that measured the intensity of the studio audience's response to the sad
or inspirational details of her story. The special rewards of temporary
royalty included a makeover at a Max Factor salon, dinner at the
Coconut Grove, and an array of clothing, appliances, and beauty aids
from named manufacturers. Women who qualified as "new citizen
queens" were whisked off to Washington, D.C., in the company of a local
congressman for a tour of government sites and possibly a photo
opportunity with then Vice-President Richard Nixon. At a time when
tension between the United States and Eastern bloc countries was high,
members of Queen for a Day's staff communicated regularly with the
State Department to secure entry of candidates' relatives from "behind
the Iron Curtain."3
Amid all this largesse, the also-ran contestants did not go home
empty-handed; everyone received gifts from the program's sponsors.
Using a variety of rhetorical and representational postures, Queen for
a Day offered these women to viewers as caring, selfless-and dependent.
The host's structured interactions with the candidates during the on-air
interviews seemed designed to reinforce the culturally dominant idea
that a woman worthy to be queen was a dutiful and devoted stay-at-
home mom whose foray into the public world of broadcast network
programming left her daunted, and sometimes literally speechless.
Ignoring evidence that many of his interviewees worked or needed to
work outside the home for economic reasons-as factory workers,
bowling-alley pin setters, or aircraft assemblers-the emcee unvaryingly
asked candidates what their husbands did for a living, and how many
children they had. Discussions about a candidate's own employment only
followed a disclosure that she had a history of working to meet family
expenses, usually because her husband was absent or disabled. It was
this contingency-the loss of a male breadwinner-that insurance
companies warned about in Life magazine advertisements,4 while child-
rearing and sex-role experts worried over its socially subversive
Dwight Anthony, Mesmerizer of the Middle-aged, TV Guide, Sept. 7, 1963 at 19.
Wendy Kozol, LIFE'S AMERICA: FAMILY AND NATION IN POSTWAR PHOTOJOURNALISM
126 (1994).
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implications.5 In these instances the emcee typically was approving:
working to support a dependent family was what any good mother would
do.
Queen for a Day's rituals-the detailed description of consumer
goods, the advertisements promoting labor-saving items and appear-
ance-enhancing cosmetics, the women's diffidence in relation to a slickly
reassuring male emcee, the focus on child rearing, the portrayal of
women's employment as a financial necessity brought on by a husband's
death or incapacity, the celebration of American citizenship-were emble-
matic of deeply gendered postwar views of suburban consumerism. As
historian Elaine Tyler May has shown, this domestic ideology celebrated
traditional gender roles in a suburban "nuclear" family in which
women's principal contribution was the reproduction of patriotic (anti-
communist) citizens/consumers.6 At the height of the early Cold War era,
no less an authority than the then unassailable F.B.I. Director J. Edgar
Hoover reminded women that they performed a crucial civic duty when
they took up motherhood as a "career," helping the nation's efforts to
battle the two principal social pathologies and threats to a free state,"crime and communism."7 Because the nuclear family strengthened the
moral resolve of good citizens against the prospect of nuclear attack,
women's civic-minded conjugal sexuality was held out as a kind of
patriotic familialism, constituting an act of citizenship in itself.' At the
same time, government policy makers and big business assumed that
the combination of affordable suburban housing, modern appliances, and
"the right to choose" among competing consumer brands, would satisfy
women/homemakers-U.S. consumers par excellence-and solidify the
' Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE
EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 225 (1978).
6 Elaine Tyler May, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA
174, 181 (1988); Elaine Tyler May, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS
AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 132-133, 153 (1995). Cold war anxieties
influenced the physical remove of white urban residents to the suburbs as well as the
ideology that produced, in Richard Sennett's words, an "intense family life." While
federally-subsidized highways leading to suburban towns doubled as evacuation routes,
the strategy of "defense through decentralization" countered the risk that large
concentrations of city-based industrial capital and workers would be targeted for a
nuclear attack. Homeward Bound, id. at 132-33.
May, Barren in the Promised Land, supra note 6, at 133.
8 At the same time, popular cultural representations of the communist threat often
depicted the forces of subversion in the form of a seductive woman-highlighting the
double-edged, contradictory images of women's sexuality that circulated in postwar U.S.
culture. See, e.g., Homeward Bound, supra note 6, at 109-112.
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appeal of the "free market," the American way.9 During this cultural
moment, Queen for a Day played its part in promoting"family-centered"
consumption of televised products and traditional gender values.
* * *
This cultural linkage between the domestic/dependent woman and
consumption also appears in the law of products liability. The accelera-
tion of mass-production and marketing practices in the postwar economy
was marked by a shift in the legal rules relating to sales of consumer
goods. A crucial component of this doctrinal shift was a broadening of
the category of buyer to that of consumer. By the postwar period, the law
had retreated from the long-entrenched principle of caveat emptor and
moved toward an extraordinary solicitude for the "powerless" consumer.
Legal commentators conventionally explain this doctrinal change as
courts fashioning doctrinal rulings in response to problems created by
technological advances or other economic and social factors.1 ° This legal
functionalism was embossed with a legal realist "gloss" to emphasize
social policy. As the standard analysis goes, the move to a regime of
strict liability within the law of sales (and ultimately in the law of torts)
was an appropriate response to heightened levels of risk resulting from
(1) the proliferation of mass-produced goods in the postwar era, and (2)
the use of mass advertising strategies that, in creating demand, induced
undue reliance on product safety.
In this Article, I offer a cultural-narrative analysis of postwar con-
sumer protection doctrine. By drawing on interdisciplinary approaches
developed in feminist legal studies, lawyering theory, critical legal
history, media studies, and cultural studies, the article traces the con-
solidation of the consumer as a feminized legal subject. Analyzing the
rhetorics and narrative structures of influential postwar judicial
opinions, advocates' arguments, and legal commentaries, it will show
how an emerging doctrinal trend of protecting consumers against the
risks of living in a mass-marketed society responded to a culturally
pervasive sense of disempowerment linked to gendered "types" in
postwar popular culture-the feminized "organization man" and the stay-
at-home woman. By emphasizing the ways in which law resonates with
cultural knowledge, this article offers a critical historical perspective
and illuminates the hidden narratives and ideologies that shaped
9 May, Homeward Bound, supra note 6, 16-19, at 172.
10 See, e.g., Laura Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 17, 37-38 (1986).
u Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 63-65 (1984).
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postwar consumer protection doctrine. In Robert Gordon's words, it
attempts to "unsettle" and "destabilize" the functionalist explanation
that consumer protection law responded to material and technological
changes in society. 2
I apply the cultural-narrative approach to developments in postwar
consumer protection doctrine in the context of postwar suburbia, cold
war consumerism, and domesticity, that viewed together, contributed to
an ideology of powerlessness which manifested itself during the postwar
era. I then map the changing landscape of the law of sales and its
underlying ideology, with its shift from the knowledgeable buyer to the
disempowered consumer. In this section I examine three influential
cases from the New Jersey Supreme Court that, in the early 1960s,
spearheaded a substantial expansion of legal protection for consumers
nationally-Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors;3 Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc.,4 and Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. 5 In each of these
cases, the court adopted public policy considerations to benefit persons
who were not eligible for redress under established liability rules. 6
My analysis will focus attention on how consumer protection law
internalized contemporary narratives of suburban consumerism and
gender role stereotypes. I will examine ways in which the opinions, the
parties' legal arguments, and influential treatises and commentaries
invoked the cultural figure of the postwar suburbanite, personified as
the feminized consumer, to signify the powerless position of the
consumer in society and, in turn, to justify the law's increasingly
protective stance. This reading will show that, unlike the long lineage
of protective laws that explicitly drew their justification from concep-
tions of women as dependent, vulnerable, and in need of protection, 7 the
surface neutrality of the category of the consumer masked the ways in
which postwar legal discourse coded the consumer as a helpless,
suburban woman. Whatever salutary effect the law of consumer
protection achieved as reform-minded legal doctrine, it should also,
paradoxically, be understood as embracing and reinforcing pernicious
cultural stereotypes about women and power.
12 Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 Stan. L. Rev.
1023, 1024, 1026-27 (1997).
13 32 N.J. 358 (1960).
14 44 N.J. 70 (1965).
15 44 N.J. 52 (1965).
16 Schipper and Santor also recognized an alternative tort basis for recovery that has
since come to displace the warranty rationale for manufacturer liability.
"7 For an extended discussion of these cases, see Barbara A. Babcock et al., SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY 80-130 (2d ed. 1996).
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II. A CULTURAL-NARRATIVE APPROACH
Robert Cover, among other commentators, reminds us that the
creation of legal meaning occurs through a cultural filter."i Law's "deep
meaning" is informed by subconscious cultural knowledge,19 and its
methods, arguments, and reasons for exercising power are drawn from
a "common stock of understanding in the surrounding culture."2° A
cultural-narrative approach entails tracing and deriving meaning from
cultural logics that are embedded in legal discourse. Anthony Amster-
dam and Jerome Bruner have shown in Minding the Law21 that judges
and lawyers necessarily draw on "culturally shaped processes of
categorizing, storytelling, and persuasion,"22 typically in the form of
recognizable narratives" which bear what is significant to a culture,
reflected in its "stories, its genres, its enduring myths."24 The narratives
of a community express, and confer meaning on, its rules and institu-
tions-the "cultural understandings that constitute a community's
internal norms."2" The process of eliciting law's embedded narratives is,
thus, crucial to legal analysis. And as Linda Edwards demonstrates,
competing narratives reveal tensions in legal doctrine that are also
tensions within culture and society.26 Moreover, narrative logic, no less
than propositional logic, functions rhetorically-courts and advocates use
it as a form of persuasion.2" Drawing attention to narrative modalities
such as the temporality of events-when a "relevant" legal story
begins-and character-whether and how a legal text includes a party's
perspective and voice-reveals much about how judges as well as trial
and appellate advocates have framed legal and factual issues in a case,
and how they have come to terms with precedent and history.28
The focus oflawyering theory on cultural narratives that shape legal
doctrine intersects with work in feminist legal studies concerning the
18 Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos as Narrative, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11 (1983).
19 See Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 830 (1996).
20 Gordon, supra note 11, at 90.
21 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 154.
24 Id. at 111-112.
2 Cover, supra note 18, at note 137.
26 Linda Edwards, The Convergence of Analogic and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal
Discourse, 20 Legal Stud. F. 7, 12 (1996).
27 Amsterdam & Bruner, supra note 21, at 134-135.
Id. at 150-153.
Vol. 27
2003 The Postwar Consumer as Feminized Legal Subject 227
pervasiveness of mythic thinking about women, thinking which comes
at the expense of the complexity of women's lived experience.' Because,
as Peggy Cooper Davis reminds us, language is a "window to the
unconscious," the appearance of proverbial stories in legal discourse can
illuminate the ways in which legal actors have reinforced "unconsciously
gendered thinking." ° To borrow Martha Chamallas's terms, excavating
the "deep structures"3 ' of legal doctrine reveals constitutive gender bias
and "implicit hierarchies of value" 2 that have influenced the ways in
which law develops. As feminist critics have shown, attending to
cultural narratives in legal doctrine reveals their gendered nuances, and
our culture's stereotypes about women, in two distinct ways. First, a
cultural focus draws attention to the gender-based social contexts in
which ostensibly gender-neutral legal categories and rules have actually
developed (i.e., women's experiences and limited social roles become an
unacknowledged measure of general doctrinal categories such as
compensable injuries in tort).' Second, analyzing law through a cultural
prism shows how the use of legal language and reasoning, built around
polarities, conflicts, or social hierarchies, assimilates women to men's
experience and perspectives, or to formally neutral standards that are
in fact male-normed.'
Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber's deconstruction of the
gendered dimensions of the law of fright 5 illustrates the first of these
gender-inflected approaches, focusing on how women's social roles have
been incorporated into the body of tort doctrine. In their historical
analysis, they show that traditionally the common law allowed only a
narrow scope of recovery for plaintiffs, typically women, who sought
' Judith Olans Brown, et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women
in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA Women's L. J., 457,458-459,461; Lucinda M. Finley,
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 886, 905 (1989); Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of
Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 Am. U. J.
Gender & Law 147, 157-158, 168 (1996).
30 Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 Rec. Assoc. Bar City N.Y. 7 (1993).
3' Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 463 (1998).
32 See Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias, and Tort Law,
6 Roger Williams L. Rev. 9, 23-28 (2000)(positing that courts consider not only the kind
of injury but the identity of the person injured-including gender-when categorizing
legally compensable losses).
" See, e.g., Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814 (1990).
34 See text accompanying notes 43 to 47.
3 Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 33.
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compensation for fright-induced injuries after witnessing an upsetting
event.3 6 In routinely devaluing women's experience of emotional trauma
on the basis of stereotypes about women's emotionally unstable,
neurasthenic proclivities, courts first limited recovery for bystanders of
traumatic events to those who experienced some physical impact.37 Later
courts expanded recovery to include fright-based emotional injuries for
bystanders whose inuries were caused by fear of personal harm, or who
were in the zone of physical danger.3" It was only in 1968, in a case in
which a mother watched as her child was struck and killed by a car, that
the California Supreme Court broadened the basis for recovery in fright-
based claims to plaintiffs who were within an emotional zone of
danger.3 9 The plausibility that a mother would be in such a childcare-
taking situation-the conjunction of the facts and the court's own
understanding of pro-natalist ideology during the height of the cold
war-enabled the court to appreciate that emotional trauma was
legitimately compensable-and not for women only.4' Thus, in both its
liability-restricting and expanding phases, the law of fright had a
gender-ideological basis, resonating with the ways in which the culture
valued or considered women's experience.
Along similar lines, Lea VanderVelde has examined the gendered
social context in which the negative-covenant rule restricted the cir-
cumstances under which female performers-but ultimately male as well
as female defendants-were granted the right to be released from their
employment contracts upon paying money damages.4 1 To explain the
frequency with which suits were brought against women performers-a
fact which may be related, VanderVelde suggests, to women's perceived
need to break away from oppressive employment situations-
VanderVelde highlighted the narrow scope for independent action
allowed to women performers, and women generally, in nineteenth-
century society.4 2
At the same time, close scrutiny of the rhetoric of law reveals
another kind of gender inflection, in which legal language and struc-
tures privilege social understandings of men's experience and thus
36 Id.
31 Id. at 824-834.
3 Id. at 821, 837-85 1.
a Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 (1968)(en banc).
o Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 33, at 860-861.
4' Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men's
Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 108 Yale L. J. 775 (1992).
42 Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 33, at 825-834.
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suppress women's differences.' Lucinda Finley's discussion of the
gendered nature of legal reasoning is instructive. Finley has emphasized
the problem of "fit" between women's experience and the frameworks in
which legal doctrine has been cast, for example, the extent to which law
frames women's concerns in terms of oppositional interests (fetus versus
mother, sexual domination versus free speech rights), and how legal
discourse leaches out emotion and expressiveness." In a similar vein,
Joan Williams has argued that the unthinking use of the rhetoric of"choice" assimilates women to a liberal, facially gender-neutral view of
the self-interested, autonomous individual that overlooks the
countervailing rhetoric of domesticity. This domestic rhetoric, in turn,
not only critiques liberal self-interest but, more problematically, is
linked to a "covert norm of selflessness."4 Leslie Bender follows this
approach in her critique of tort law's use of the reasonable
man/reasonable person standards in a culture that treats women as
lacking reason." Arguing, for example, that the "no duty to rescue" rule
reflects tort law's assump-tion that humans are "individualistic,
autonomous, and self-interested," she proposes in its place an ethic of
care. 4
7
In this Article, I examine how postwar strict liability doctrine
expanded protection for consumers generally by drawing on cultural
understandings of the powerlessness of women. Thus, unlike the focus
of Finley, Bender, and Frug's work, I emphasize ways in which postwar
legal discourse feminized rather than masculinized or neutralized the
' See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM (1992); Finley, supra note
29; Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Educ. 3
(1981); Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue and Punish: Judicial Responses to
Fetus-Envy? 72 B.U. L. Rev. 101, 126-139 (1992). Cf. Margo Schlanger, Injured Women
Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 Harv. Women's L.J. 79 (1998)(arguing that
courts recognized women's relevant differences); BarbaraY. Welke, Unreasonable Women:
Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870-1920, 19 L. & Soc. Inq. 369 (1994)(arguing
that women were held to a lesser standard of care based on stereotypes). See Gary T.
Schwartz's discussion of these historical analyses in Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to
Tort Law, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 175, 180-186 (2001).
44 Finley, supra note 29, at 900-904.
41 Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L.Rev. 1559, 1562, 1566-67, 1572, 1581-83, 1592, 1612 (1991).
16 Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 575,
579 (1993); Bender, supra note 43 at 20-25.
47 Bender, An Overview, supra note 46, at 580; Bender, supra note 43, at 31.
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legal category of the consumer. As the gendered underpinnings of the
law of fright and the Lumley rule suggest, it is productive to map shifts
in legal doctrine by attending to the social contexts in which women
have participated in litigation as plaintiffs (injured bystanders) and
defendants (employees seeking relief from contractual performance
obligations). But unlike the link between gender and culture revealed in
the Lumley and the law of fright doctrines, I draw attention not to the
actual social experience of women as consumers but to those consumer
protection cases which resonate with cultural perceptions of
powerlessness, a culture in which women's disempowerment is
emblematic.
These discourses of powerlessness range from the popular and
scholarly literature on suburbia to Queen for a Day's melding of con-
sumerism, pro-natalism, and cold war ideologies. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reinforced this cultural link between consumer and
women in a series of case narratives in which the court portrayed
women in the sexualized terms of their reproductive capacity-not as
agents "capable of making trustworthy decisions in complex situa-
tions."4" Consumers were either actual mothers who lacked agency or
they were represented as (potential) mothers,49 through a process in
which the consumer's gender was enacted metaphorically-the consumer
as a seduced, inseminated woman. In its emphasis on the gendered
dimensions of legal discourse-in examining how language resonates in
gendered and sexualized ways in legal texts, in exposing the cultural
stereotypes that lay behind legal reasoning and rhetoric, and in using
gender categories to interpret putatively ungendered issues-this article
is guided by the postmodern sensibility developed in Mary Joe Frug's
foundational work.50
III. IN THE GRIP OF POWERLESSNESS
Postwar women's privatized, housebound world-where the only
option was, as Betty Friedan has put it, "Occupation: Housewife"5 1-was
premised on an oppressive, gendered model of family life and division of
labor. Touting the pleasures of the suburban home-preferably a
sprawling, one-story ranch-style model tailored to the needs of families
4 Reilly, supra note 29, at 157-158, 168.
4' Here I borrow Elizabeth A. Reilly's actual/potential dyad. See id. at 158.'o Judith G. Greenberg, Introduction to Frug, supra note 43, at xix, xxv; Frug, supra
note 43, at 107, 112-114, 118.
M1 Betty Friedan, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 18 (1963).
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with children5 2-advertisers of consumer products held up suburban life
as an antidote to the corporatist, bureaucratized workplace. Home was
haven for a male work force and site of a domestic woman's
uncompensated labor."3 As Queen for a Day offered its televisual model
of good-mother citizenship, popular periodicals such as Life and Reader's
Digest performed a similar function. Both publications conjoined the
quotidian and the personal with a grander sense of geopolitical mission
and history54-or, to paraphrase cultural studies scholar Lauren
Berlant-they demonstrated ways in which the political was in fact also
the personal.55 Like Queen for a Day, Life's photojournalism valorized
the ideals of domesticity, suburban living, and the patriotic character of
consumption while highlighting the metonymic role of "ordinary"
people-stand-ins for a broader social landscape.56
As these popular media and familial themes occupied a more central
role in daily life, a body of sociological and psychological literature, itself
often popularized-Maryna Farnham and Ferdinand Lundberg's Modern
Woman: The Lost Sex,57 John Bowlby's theory of parental attachment,8
Talcott Parsons' work on parental gender roles,59 and Benjamin Spock's
child development books-addressed the crucial importance of proper
mothering to the formation of loyal, national subjects with appropriate
gender identities.' In these works, the dangers of both permissiveness
and overprotectiveness loomed large.61 As if to allay the undercurrent of
anxiety within this literature about women's role, prime-time television
programming, daytime game/giveaway formats such as Queen for a Day,
and the corporate advertising that paid for them, offered a picture of
family harmony, stability, and broad social consensus in which women-
52 See, e.g., Dolores Hayden, REDESIGNING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE FUTURE OF
HOUSING, WORK, AND FAMILY LIFE 6, 12, 18 (1984).
5 Lynn Spigel, "Women's Work,"in Horace Newcomb (ed.), TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL
VIEW 19-45 (5th ed. 1994).
5 See Joanne P. Sharp, CONDENSING THE COLD WAR: READER'SDIGEST AND AMERICAN
IDENTITY xvi, 82, 85 (2000); Kozol, supra note 4, at 5.
" Lauren Berlant, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX
AND CITIZENSHIP 178 (1997).
Kozol, supra note 4, at 9.
5 Ehrenreich & English, supra note 5, at 212, 222.
For differently nuanced treatments of Bowlby's theories compare Ehrenreich &
English, supra note 5, at 206-208 and Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look
at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 347 (1996).
" Ehrenreich & English, supra note 5, at 223.
60 Id. at 217-226.
61 Id. at 195-198, 208-211.
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actual and fictive-tended to be stay-at-home mother-nurturers.62 At the
same time, the integrative effects of mass media, especially advertising
and television programming, mitigated woman's suburban isolation. As
media scholar Lynn Spigel has noted, postwar television, the "suburban
home companion," offered a"window on the world," ranging from images
of social interaction which invited viewers to join in, to program themes
of neighborhood bonding.63 Programs like Queen for a Day and its
corporate sponsors played their part, holding up a seemingly attainable
ideal of consumer-oriented domesticity and temporary immersion in a
public world.
The Uses of Mass Psychology: Manipulating the Woman as Consumer
National advertising may have enjoyed its highest level of influence
in the postwar era, in large part because of the pervasiveness of
television, but it was not without its detractors. The critical discussion
of mass advertising focused on the way advertisers for big business
helped to secure widespread acceptance of consumerism throughout
society.' Although postwar corporate public relations campaigns such
as those of master publicist Edward Bernays sought to maximize profit,
the corporate advertisers for whom Bernays and others worked also
waged an "ideological war" against New Deal-style big government and
other social and geopolitical forces that threatened their long-term
property interests.65 Both medium and message, advertising deployed
a variety of rhetorical and iconic strategies to reinforce a set of cultural
assumptions about the American way. As sociologist David Riesman has
argued, the effect of the media on the "style of perception.., the sense
of what it means to be an American boy or girl, man or woman, or old
folks" was far more pervasive than the vaunted power to sell a product.66
Paradoxically, in the midst of the paranoia of the Cold War, the very
methods advertisers used to activate subliminal desires for consumer
goods appeared suspiciously like social engineering, raising concerns
that a manipulable populace might be susceptible to more subversive,
62 Ella Taylor, PRIME-TIME FAMILIES 20-21, 27, 29-40 (1992).
'3 Lynn Spigel, The Suburban Home Companion: Television and the Neighborhood
Ideal in Postwar America," in Julie D'Acci et al. (eds.), FEMINIST TELEVISION CRITICISM:
A READER 211-234, at 213, 223-226 (1997).
4 Jackson Lears, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN
AMERICA 235 (1994).
65 Stuart Ewen, PR!: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 357-359, 362-364 (1996).
' David Riesman, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN
CHARACTER liv (1969 ed.)(1948)(with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney).
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even seditious, mind-control techniques.67 As Marshall McLuhan
commented in 1947, "this kind of action for direct social control is
politics.., these appetites for private power are inventing the means of
possessing political power for the future."8 Perhaps more than any other
work of postwar popular discourse, Vance Packard's 1957 bestseller, The
Hidden Persuaders, captured this sense of paranoia in relation to
powerful promotional methods.
This book is... about the large-scale efforts being made, often with
impressive success, to channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing
decisions, and our thought processes by the use of insights gleaned
from psychiatry and the social sciences. Typically these efforts take
place beneath our level of awareness; so that the appeals which move
us are often, in a sense, "hidden." The result is that many of us are
being influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the
patterns of our everyday lives.69
For Packard, the relentless pursuit of motivation for behavior created a
disquieting Orwellian world. Ifmanufacturers'"antihumanistic" promo-
tion of mass psychology could induce consumers to suspend their powers
of discernment in the marketplace, Packard worried that a large state
apparatus stood ready to use these same mechanisms to "protect"
citizens against external encroachments, treating voters like "Pavlov's
conditioned dog."70
If some present-day commentators reject Packard's assumption that
consumers are passive"morons [or] puritans,"7' Packard is still applaud-
ed for "demystifying" the advertiser's toolkit72 in which industry spent
"billions" annually on advertising, and used social science techniques to
cultivate a sense of "psychological obsolescence" and a desire for
novelty.73 Infusing new meaning into the warning: "let the buyer be-
ware,"74 Packard recapitulated the terms of an earlier debate about
manipulative advertising. In 1908, Walter Dill Scott's The Psychology of
67 Lears, supra note 64, at 251-252.
Marshall McLuhan, "American Advertising," in Bernard Rosenberg & David
Manning White (eds.), MAss CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS IN AMERICA 435-442, at 437
(1957).
69Vance Packard, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3 (1957).
70 Id. at 4.
71 Virginia Postrel, Pleasures of Persuasion, <http'//www.reason.com.10peds/op080299/
html>.
72 Futrelle, Media Circus: The Hidden Persuaders, <httpJ/www.saon.com/media/
media/96/217.html>.
73 Packard, supra note 69, at 21-22.
14 Id. 27.
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Advertising, and Edward Bernays' 1928 primer on public relations,
Propaganda, had anticipated approvingly examining the marketing
potential of subliminal appeals to the realm of feeling.75 On the other
hand, consumer-oriented books such as Your Money's Worth by Stuart
Chase and Frederick Schlink 5 and Our Master's Voice, James Rorty's
1934 Veblenesque critique, considered this prospect with alarm. Antici-
pating Packard's concerns from a left perspective, Rorty argued that
advertising was essentially entrepreneurs' "special pleading," a frank
appeal to the "material, moral, and spiritual contents of the Good Life,"
and an exercise in "creative psychiatry."77
As Betty Friedan, David Riesman, William Whyte, and other post-
war social commentators would also do, Packard drew attention to ways
in which women figured in postwar consumerist ideology7" based on the
" See T.J. Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the
Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930," in Richard Fox & T.J. Jackson
Lears (eds.), THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
1880-1980 3-38 (1983). See also discussion of Scott in Susan Strosser, SATISFACTION
GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET 148 (1989); Ewen, supra note
65, at 34, 164-170 (discussing Bernays).
76 See Robert N. Mayer, THE CONSUMERMOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OFTHE MARKETPLACE
20-21 (1989).
77 James Rorty, OUR MASTER'S VOICE 16,239 (1934). In the 1920s generally, the belief
that consumers were easily manipulated found expression in advertisements that lacked
informational content. In fact, as Stuart Ewen has documented, the exercise of the
intellect, the very possibility of giving informed consideration to consumer products,
seemed entirely foreclosed by the complexities of the manufacturing process. In 1929, one
home economist lamented that it was "impossible for the homemaker to have command
of all the information demanded to buy intelligently." Stuart Ewen, CAPTAINS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE 165
(1976). During the Depression, the same attributes that led advertisers to think of the'
buying public as having a "group mind," also encouraged the view that the electorate was
simply a mass audience waiting to be persuaded by the platforms of managerial elites.
Rorty developed these concerns in Our Master's Voice. Observing that:"[m]ass literacy,
mass communication and mass advertising... pervert[s] the integrity of the editor-reader
relationship essential to.. democracy" because it involves "reader-exploitation, cultural
malnutrition and stultification," Our Master's Voice, id., at 16-17, Rorty feared not the
masses but the self-deluded advertising professionals who, he believed, were headed for
a fascist future." Advertising is propaganda, advertising is education, propaganda is
advertising, education is propaganda, educational institutions use and are used by
advertising and propaganda... it is impossible to dissociate the phenomena.., all three,
each in itself, or in combination are instruments of rule." Id. at 170 (italics in original).
As the Depression wore on, business interests resorted to market surveys and opinion
research, engaging academics who applied the methods of behavioral psychology to
measuring public opinion-and even to shaping it through the ways in which questions
were framed and results reported. Ewen, supra note 65 at 183, 185, 188.
78 Packard, supra note 69 at 116.
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paradox that women, albeit disempowered in the larger culture in
relation to men, nonetheless managed consumption for the family.79
Although sellers of goods continued pre-war, pretelevisual marketing
strategies that also had been pitched to women, ° the postwar
availability of the vastly more influential medium of television, coupled
with an ideology that redomesticated American women, only intensified
that gendered address.81 The automotive industry was illustrative,
sponsoring ads that were aesthetically oriented and even enlisted
women's interest in servicing and repair. Ernest Dichter, a psychologist
whose Institute of Motivational Research performed countless "depth
studies" to probe the psychology of consuming, concluded that "the
woman has taken over and she has taken over quite thoroughly."82 Betty
Friedan, whose influential Feminine Mystique challenged the cult of
domesticity and its popularizers in the advertising industry, quoted a
representative advertising text:
Are you this woman? Giving your kids the fun and advantages you
want for them? Taking them places and helping them do things?
Taking the part that's expected of you in church and community affairs
... developing your talents so you'll be more interesting? You can be
the woman you yearn to be with a Plymouth all your own. Go where
you want, when you want in a beautiful Plymouth that's yours and
nobody else's.'
Summing up Dichter's approach, Friedan offered this assessment:
"Properly manipulated, the American housewife can be given the sense
of identity, purpose, creativity, self-realization, even the sexual joy they
lack-by the buying of things."' 4
79 Id. at 3-7, 92-93, 107.
o See Ewen, supra note 77, at 167-176; Lears, supra note 75, at 26-27.
81 May, Homeward Bound, supra note 6, at 87,166-167; see generally Spigel, supra note
53.
s Packard, supra note 69, at 92-93.
3 Friedan, supra note 51, at 229.
Id. at 208. Looking back from the 1990s to the postwar era, Joanne Meyerowitz has
taken issue with the assumption that postwar women had no alternative space within
which to challenge the cult of domesticity. Arguing that Friedan and Elaine Tyler May
have universalized the experience of white, middle-class women who did not work outside
the home, she suggests that other political and sexual identities coexisted with the
dominant domestic ideology. See generally Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine
Mystique," in Joanne Meyerowitz (ed.), NOT JuNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN
POSTWARD AMERICAN 229-262 (1994). See also Meyerowitz, "Introduction: Women and
Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960," in Not June Cleaver, id., at 1-16. The numbers
of working women who appeared on Queen for a Day offer support for Meyerowitz's argu-
ment. Nonetheless, the domestic ideology was dominant precisely because mainstream
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These gendered appeals took account of phenomena like "impulse
buying," which seemed to intensify with the growing dominance of the
supermarket. By the mid-1950s, for example, beer and spirits ads used
packaging and configuration of containers to stimulate buying among
women." Packard recounted one experiment that used a hidden camera
to demonstrate the relationship between women's impulse buying and
the varying levels of tension they experienced when faced with a
plethora of products. Noting that the observed women's eye-blink rate
plummeted as they began to stroll along the aisles, one researcher
linked impulse buying among these subjects with the hypnotic effects of
abundance. Armed with this information, advertisers devised package-
design and shelving strategies that would heighten the hypnotic effect-
using eye-catching colors, choosing images that stimulated the senses,
shelving products at eye level.s6
For Packard, the upshot of this preoccupation with subliminal, non-
rational appeals was diminished personal autonomy: "The most serious
offense many of the depth manipulators commit... is that they try to
invade the privacy of our minds. It is this right to privacy in our minds-
privacy to be either rational or irrational-that I believe we must strive
to protect."87
It was only a short step, Packard seemed to suggest, from
advertisers' struggles to win over individual minds at (the suburban)
home to the global battle for ideological dominance.
From Groupmindedness to the Unwitting Consumer
Packard's critique of advertising resonated with William H. Whyte's
observations in The Organization Man, the 1956 study of the influence
of corporate organizational values in the workplace and on social roles
and interactions more generally.88 Whyte drew attention to the risks of
"deifying" bureaucratic structures and the set of values that
bureaucracies typically encourage: respect for authority, passivity, the
cultivation of loyalty to the organization, the subordination of the
individual to the group, the emergence of a technocratic orientation.8 9
The crux of Whyte's argument was that the ideology of the organization
political and cultural fixtures, from J. Edgar Hoover to the mediated world of Queen for
a Day, presented it as normative.
's Packard, supra note 69, at 93-95.
86 Id. at 105-110.
7 Id. at 266.
" William H. Whyte, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
Id. at 7, 12-13, 63-64, 66, 70-72, 78-89.
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encouraged an "idolatry of the system" and an improper use of science
to accomplish this bureaucratization. In his studies of widely used
personality tests, Whyte saw instead a pernicious, value-laden "loyalty
test" designed to identify the "conformist, the pedestrian, the
unimaginative."9° His interviews of corporate wives disclosed that these
women also acquiesced to organizational imperatives. In the main, his
interviewees concurred that a "good wife" is one who subordinates her
will to the organization and suppresses "open intellectualism or the
desire to be alone."9 '
In his study of the postwar suburb of Park Forest, Illinois, Whyte
saw an extension of organizational values, a "constantly replenished,
nonsatiable reservoir of 30,000 people."92 The suburban development
was a "second melting pot" and "ideal way station" for the rootless,
corporately mobile middle class.9 3 In the standard critical narrative, the
new suburbanites were upwardly striving and excessively willing to
conform to "social virtues," while cut off from the variety and richness
of urban experience.9' Whyte's study tended to confirm this perception;
even granting that many of his subjects were not "unwitting pawns," he
concluded that suburbia reflected the "interchangeability so sought by
organization." And many organization people admitted that they felt
passive and objectified, "more acted upon than acting."9
Whyte's investigations of group conformity echoed James Rorty's
Depression-era concern about the coercive potential of government radio
broadcasts. These broadcasts, Federal Radio Commissioner LaFount
opined in 1933, would ensure, more effectively than a "standing army,"
a stabilizing groupmindedness: the "whole nation would be thinking
together."96 In a related vein, Vance Packard had noted how postwar
suburban developments such as Florida's Miramar traded on a
manufactured sense of community, in which gregarious neighborliness
and preplanned sociability left little room for idiosyncratic expression.
Beyond the relentless togetherness that Whyte observed in Park Forest,
90 Id. at 182.
9' Id. at 258-259.
92 Id. at 282-283.
93 Id. at 280-282, 298. 300.
4 See, e.g., id. at 312-317, 396; Richard Sennett, THE USES OF DISORDER, 72, 184-188
(1970). See also discussion in Jackson Lears, supra note 64, at 236.
95 Id. at 395-396.
96 Rorty, supra note 77, at 278. Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport's 1935 collaboration
perceived a similar homogenizing potential in radio, noting the character of radio to.encourage people to think and feel alike." Hadley Cantril & Gordon Allport, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RADIO 20 (1935).
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Miramar represented a truly "packaged" development in which friends
as well as furnishings were supplied. 7
For Whyte, the consumerism that marked the burgeoning middle
class was linked to the passivity that had become identified with the
new suburbanites. Their "budgetism," a preference for making pre-
scheduled payments of all monthly expenses, was, he concluded, a
program for divesting personal control over finances.98 In matters of the
marketplace, these suburbanites seemed positively ingenuous, if not
incompetent:
A pathetic spectacle is the show of zeal the husband will affect when
reading a sales contract; it wouldn't make the slightest difference what
outrageous provisions were inserted, he would still read on, compre-
hending nothing. Among young people there seems to be a strong faith
that the protective legislation of the last 20 years such as the small
loan acts, has somehow reversed the law of caveat emptor. One would
think, for example, that they had lived long enough to be implacably
suspicious of any automobile dealer, but they are not. They are so
trusting that they almost never multiply to find out how much of a"pack" the dealer is taking them for."
Budgetism-if not the overbearing effect of the dealers' practices, Whyte
concluded-had dulled these suburbanites' wits and powers of
discernment.
Whyte's focus on groupmindedness also resonated with David
Riesman's influential 1950 study, The Lonely Crowd."° Canvassing the
attitudes and behavior of the "new" middle class of bureaucrats and
salaried white-collar workers, Riesman described as a distinctive social
type the "other-directed" person-marked by a "heightened self-
consciousness about relations to people" and a desire to be "loved rather
than esteemed." 1 ' Acknowledging the powerful pull of this desire
toward the preferences of others, Riesman saw the potential for "close
behavioral conformity." 102 In a period of abundance, the world of work
became bound up with methods of "communication and control, not of
tooling or factory layout." 3
Riesman was especially sensitive to postwar society's threat to
women's autonomy: as part of the peacetime effort to "reprivatize"
7 Packard, supra note 69, at 233-235.
00 Whyte, supra note 89, at 323-326.
99 Id. at 323-325.
100 See note 66, supra.
101 Id. at xiv, xxxii.
102 Id. at 21.103 Id. at 128.
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women into a "comfortably domestic and traditional" role, the "house-
wife's" labor produced social value that was not defined as work."°4 And
although he initially looked to popular culture as a possible source of
autonomy for the other-directed person, Riesman later rejected the
national chauvinism of the press, caught up in the "self-serving slogans
and misleading rhetoric of the Cold War."0 5 It was in self-awareness and
resistance to overconformity, Riesman suggested, that the possibility for
autonomy existed.
Whether the perceived threat to autonomy originated from
totalitarian regimes or the corporate employers of motivational
researchers, the sense of siege that these discourses registered gave
them their distinctive, if alarmist, shape. At the same time, postwar
discourses about suburbia were never monolithic; more nuanced
accounts did moderate the critique, while retaining the prevailing
conceptual and rhetorical framework. In the ethnographic study, The
Levittowners, sociologist Herbert Gans concluded that on balance the
new community of Willingboro, New Jersey, founded by the Levitt
organization, was "a good place to live.""° Suburbia was not a new social
formation, but simply "old social structures on new land." 7 Although
New Jersey's Levittown was not without its limitations, Gans did not
find within it the threat to autonomy that other commentators had
emphasized:
Levittowners are not really members of... a mass society. They are
not apathetic conformists ripe for a takeover by a totalitarian elite or
corporate merchandiser; they are not conspicuous consumers and
slaves to sudden whims of cultural and political fashion; they are not
even organization men or particularly other-directed personalities.0 8
104 Id. at 262, 280, 282.
105 Id. at iv.
106 Herbert J. Gans, ThE LEVrrrOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND PoLITIc INANEWSUBURBAN
COMMUNITY 432 (1967).
107 Id. at vi.
"08 Id. at 417. Other commentators on suburbia remind us that the critical discourses
have been reductive in assuming, or emphasizing, that the postwar suburb was the
preserve ofwhite-collar middle-class consumers. As Bennett Berger argued in "The Myth
of Suburbia," the anti-suburban critics assumed homogeneity, flattening out the
differences among the suburban communities in terms of cost of housing, income level,
occupation, and educational attainment. Noting the emergence of working-class suburbs
made possible by postwar prosperity, he concurred with Gans that suburban living per
se does not create a new social entity. Rather, he marshalled evidence that working class
suburbs were marked by "working-class attitudes," that the residents of these
communities were not transformed by the suburban form. Nor does Bennett see any
intrinsic connection between suburbia and the evils usually attributed to it: "Surely, there
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Yet even among Gans and other "dissenters," the links between
conformity, consumerism, and domesticity loomed large. Within these
discourses, the integral relation of powerlessness to women's disem-
powerment was a defining, if debated, issue. l 9
IV. FROM THE AUTONOMOUS To THE POWERLESS CONSUMER:
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
In the post-World War II era of labor peace and national prosperity,
mass-mediated marketing of consumer products promoted a highly
specific, class-inflected vision of the good life marked by distinctive
trends in commercial practice, residential and employment patterns,
ideas about leisure, and an orientation favoring consumption of goods.
In the postwar era, the development of suburbs, spurred by federally-
subsidized highway construction and favorable credit terms for residen-
tial building,10 literally created new landscapes that needed to be filled
in with automobiles and single-family homes. To keep pace with these
spatial and demographic trends, manufacturers increasingly relied on
mass production techniques introduced earlier in the century. With its
uniform systems and design features, the turn to mass-produced con-
sumer goods meant that a design flaw that was replicated in thousands
of identical units exposed a broad swath of consumers to the risk of
injury. While the mass production of cars and housing essential to
suburban spaces created new levels of risk, mass advertising strategies
created unprecedented levels of consumer demand: as television became
a fixture in U.S. homes, a new medium of visually arresting, imagistic
advertising became the marketing tool of choice for mass manufac-
turers.11'
Against this background, courts began to reassess the rationale for
rules that limited the liability of manufacturers whose defective
is nothing specifically suburban about conformity, status anxiety, and the rest; nor is
there anything necessarily diabolical about mass-produced domestic comfort and
conservatively cut clothes." In the end, writing from the vantage point of the late 1960s-
early 1970s, he argued that there was far too little information about suburban
communities to ascribe a "unique" status to suburbia. Bennett M. Berger, "The Myths of
Suburbia," in Charles M. Haar (ed.), THE END OF INNOCENCE: A SUBURBAN READER 36-46,
at 39-40, 42, 45-46 (1972).
"o See supra note 84.
10 See, e.g. Kenneth T. Jackson, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985); Jane Holz Kaye, ASPHALT NATION: How THE AUTOMOBILE TOOK
OVER AMERICA AND How WE CAN TAKE IT BACK (1997); May, Homeward Bound, supra
note 6, at 169.
... May, Homeward Bound, supra note 6, at 172.
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products caused injuries. Until 1907, when state legislatures began to
adopt the Uniform Sales of Goods Act, sales transactions were largely
unregulated matters of private negotiation governed by the principle of
caveat emptor, 1 2 associated with a laissez faire preference for individual
monitoring of contractual fairness over more formalized institutional
oversight."' In an era of handcrafted production in which sellers'
interactions with buyers were shaped by considerations of personal
esteem, face-to-face dealing, and more readily inspectable products, a
buyer would have no reason, and no legal right, to expect that
merchandise would be of a particular caliber, unless a seller expressly
warranted the quality of the goods. In a classic statement of the
doctrine, caveat emptor held that the purchaser had to "apply his
attention to those particulars which may be supposed, within the reach
of his observations and judgment, and the vendor to communicate those
particulars, and defects, which cannot be supposed to be immediately
within the reach of such attention.""4 Under classic liberal assumptions,
the buyer was presumed capable of inspecting the product and inquiring
about the method of production in direct, arm's-length discussions with
the seller.' Absent fraud or a seller's express representation about the
quality of the goods, the seller was not held accountable for incorrect
statements about merchandise. The risk that the seller erred in
describing the goods fell entirely on the buyer on the theory that
society's interest in the integrity of transactions justified the extra
imposition."' It was thus up to the buyer to exercise the powers of
observation and sound judgment before making a purchase.
The adoption of the Sales of Goods Act recognized some limits on the
rights of sellers to avoid liability for defective merchandise, in the form
of express and implied warranty obligations. Although the boundaries
between warranty categories have been permeable,"' typically an
express warranty is based on explicit promises or representations by a
seller about the quality of merchandise; an "implied" warranty such as
112 Lawrence Void, LAw OF SALES 428-429 (2d ed. 1959); Derrick Owles, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1978).
.. Allison Dunham, Vendor's Obligation As To Fitness of Land For A Particular
Purpose, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 108, 110 (1953).
11 Chancellor Kent in 1804, cited in Mark Geistfeld, "The 'Powerless' Consumer, the
Product Warranty and Strict Products Liability: An Analysis of Liability Rules and the
Market Control of Product-related Losses," unpublished dissertation, Columbia Univer-
sity, 1990.
1' Void, supra note 112, at 428-429.
116 Id.
17 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability, 76 Yale L. J. 887, 898-900 (1967).
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a warranty of merchantability or warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose is imposed by law, either on the basis of implicit representations
that induce the buyer to rely on the quality of the product (for example,
promoting the product for sale) or for an independent policy reason. 8
Resolving the question whether the facts of any transaction triggered
the warranty provisions of a sales-of-goods statute often required
adjudication." 9 Courts responded episodically and unsystematically as
particular doctrinal problems arose. In any case, despite warranty law's
hybrid origins, the link between sales and warranty situated these
transactions within the law of contracts, 120 making them subject to an
overlay of enforcement rules that could limit the scope or availability of
the warranty. Chief among these rules was the privity doctrine, which
held that only a party to a contract could claim rights under it. Thus, if
a member of a household became ill after eating tainted food that a
retailer had sold to another household member, the strict application of
the privity rule precluded any right of action by the person who had
been harmed. To mitigate the harshness of this result, courts looked for
ways to avoid the operation of the privity bar, fashioning alternative
theories where the facts permitted (for example, the court deemed the
injured person to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract of sale or
determined that the injured person had taken title to the item under a
gift theory before sustaining the injury).' 2 '
Manufacturers, in turn, tried to neutralize the effects of these
rulings. Most common were contractual disclaimer clauses added to
industry-wide standardized contracts (for example, a typical warranty
that manufactured parts would be free from defects was "expressly in
lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied"). 122 In theory,
contracting parties operating from a position of equal knowledge should
be permitted to bargain freely to limit the scope of the warranty
provisions. However, modern manufacturing and marketing techniques
disrupted the idea that a buyer would ever have a sufficient level of
knowledge about the production process to enable a truly unconstrained
118 See Vold, supra note 112 at 427; Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and
Society, 6 Colum. L. Rev. 699 (1936)... Void, supra note 112, at 424-463.
12' Although the origins of warranty doctrine are traceable to tort, over time warranty
concepts had become assimilated to the body of contract law and were analyzed within
a contracts framework.
121 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1123-1124 (1960).
'2' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 367 (1960).
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choice. 123 As Jackson Lears has documented, in the 1920s the view that
consumers lacked technical knowledge and thus could be manipulated
found expression in advertisements that appealed to "nonrational
longings" for adventure and cachet. 2 4 Increasingly, the targets of these
ads were women, who were thought to control the home economy and to
be susceptible to non-technical sales pitches, such as ads for "tinker-
proof" radios that they could listen to while engaged in domestic
chores. 25 At the same time, concerns that the manufacturing process
had become too complex, foreclosing the possibility of giving informed
consideration to consumer products, led one home economist to lament
that it was "impossible for the homemaker to have command of all the
information demanded to buy intelligently." 2 '
As conditions of manufacturing and marketing became more
complicated, legal scholars and advocates argued that the ordinary
buyer was rarely in a position to predict the likely level of risk in using
a product. Nor could such a buyer evaluate the wisdom of agreeing to a
disclaimer-of-liability clause inserted in the contract by the seller. In
effect, such conditions of contracting disabled the buyer from exercising
any genuine choice. As Lawrence Vold pointed out in his treatise on
sales law, the ordinary buyer, vis-a-vis the manufacturer, had the least
capacity to prevent the occurrence of defects in the product and was less
able than the manufacturer to bear (or deflect) the costs of defects when
injuries occurred. 127 Nor was there a range of choices to make, even
assuming adequate information; mass entrepreneurs such as the Levitt
organization used a limited number of models to take advantage of
economies of scale. 12S It was this situation that Void and contemporary
commentators described as one of "helplessness" and dependency. 129
No longer presuming the buyer's knowledge or capacity to discern
and choose wisely, legal texts began to embrace the idea that those for
and to whom manufacturers market their products-the emergent
category of the consumer-were "powerless," in need of protection in the
"2 Void, supra note 112, at 428- 429, 436-437, 447.
124 Lears, supra note 80, at 19-20, 27.
125 Louis Carlat, 'A Cleanser for the Mind: Marketing Radio Receivers for the American
Home, 1922-1932," in Roger Horowitz & Arwen Mohun (eds.), HIS AND HERS: GENDER,
CONSUMPTION, AND TECHNOLOGY 115-137, at 121-122, 125-128 (1998).
126 Ewen, supra note 77, at 165.
... Void, supra note 112, at 436-437, 447.
128 Gans, supra note 106, at 6-7; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90-92
(1965).
" See Void supra note 112, at 447; Prosser, supra note 121 at 1122; Note, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 318, 321, 323, 328 (1963).
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marketplace. A few legal scholars and judges, notably, Karl Llewellyn
and Roger Traynor, had begun to conceptualize the consumer in these
terms in the 1930s and 1940s. In a 1937 law review article on warranty,
Llewellyn contributed to the ideology of the "helpless" consumer who
"does not know enough, technically, to test even what is before his
eyes." 13 ° In 1944, Traynor's widely-cited concurrence in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. ,131 which upheld the plaintiffs right, in the absence of
direct proofof a manufacturer's negligence, to recover for injuries caused
by an exploding soda bottle, articulated a broader public policy rationale
for this ruling recognizing the modern-day limitations on consumers'
cognitive abilities to evaluate products:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great
markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between
the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily
either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for
himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a
sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the
steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising
and marketing devices such as trade-marks. (Citations omitted.)
Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on
faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trade
mark.132
Following this line of thought, the legal commentary of Vold and
Frederick Kessler was influential in the evolving ideology of the
consumer. Kessler developed the theory of exploitation in the1940s to
explain the operation of standardized mass contracts. He reasoned that
the sheer economic power of large-scale manufacturers enabled them to
dictate the terms and conditions of sale. This economic disparity placed
the buyer at a distinct legal disadvantage, as an unwilling party to a
contract of adhesion. 13 3 In later work, Kessler elaborated his justification
for the theory, emphasizing the buyer's unequal level of expertise vis-a-
vis the manufacturer, the "lack of technical knowledge, his inability to
evaluate the quality of many goods, and his lack of opportunity to
130 Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society 11, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341,404
(1937).
'31 24 Cal. 2d 463 (1944).
132 24 Cal. at 467 (Traynor, J., concurring).
133 Geistfeld, supra note 114, at 35-36 (citing Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 (1943)).
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inspect due to the rapid flow of goods." 34 Noting the passing of the"personal relationships" around which sales transactions in an earlier
era had been structured, Kessler advocated a straightforward
functionalist view that law should be responsive to technical change and
shifting social understandings about what is just.135
Continuing the forward-looking work of legal commentators,
William Prosser's classic 1960 law review article "The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)"36 developed the link between
expanding legal protection for the consumer and the consumer as
woman. Emphasizing the origins of warranty in the law of tort, 137
Prosser set out a rationale in favor of a torts-based rather than a
contracts-based theory of liability for injuries resulting from defective
goods. Here, Prosser carried forward the thinking of torts scholar
Fleming James, who had emphasized the goals of compensation for
injuries and loss spreading, and had embraced the social insurance
rationales developed by Crystal Eastman and Emma Corstvet in
(respectively) the Pittsburgh"3 and Columbia 39 studies, which
considered the social impact of uncompensated loss.
As James Hackney has shown, Eastman's and Corstvet's studies
used narrative techniques to portray the human (and gendered) impact
of such loss, premised on women's presumed vulnerability in their
cultural roles as reproducers and nurturers-the glue holding families
together. 40 Prosser, too, invoked a gendered cultural category-the
housewife as consumerpar excellence and proxy for women-in assessing
the extent to which warranty law left consumer injuries unredressed.
Deploying gendered scenarios loosely inspired from actual cases, he
posited that the contract-based reliance theory was underinclusive
because it did not cover the injuries of a person who was not also the
buyer of a defective product ("a guest who eats a plate of beans seldom
134 Kessler, supra note 117, at 926.
135 Id. at 891.
136 See supra note 121.
137 See also James R. Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products
Liability: A Case Study of American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist.
443, 494 (1995); Prosser, supra note 121, at 1126-1127.
'" Eastman gathered data on industrial accidents for Paul Kellogg's The Charities and
the Commons which culminated in a book, Work-Accident and the Law. See Hackney, id.
at 474-75.
139 Corstvet participated in a joint study at Columbia and Yale between 1928-1930
documenting the effects of accidents on individuals, litigation options, and the availability
of insurance. See Hackney, supra note 137, at 493.
14o Ultimately, the grounding of strict liability in torts would become the standard in
most states.
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asks the housewife whose.., they are and where she bought them").141
Similarly, if a warranty could be said to run with the goods, it did not
protect a person lacking legal title to them, such as "the friend of the
housewife who cuts her hand in a helpful attempt to reseal a glass
jar."142 The very notion of reliance was limited to persons who were in
the business of selling, as distinguished from "the housewife who sells
ajar ofjam to her neighbor."'43 (By contrast, Llewellyn's pre-World War
II consumer was represented as male or as a gender-neutral
"householder"14' and Traynor's concurrence in Escola also had gendered
the consumer as male. 145)
Whether favoring a contracts or tort rationale, by the early 1960s,
influential commentators and some courts acknowledged the need to
protect the vulnerable consumer from injury, or, at least, from the costs
of injury. Drawing extensively on the work of Prosser and others, courts
in a number of jurisdictions began to stretch the boundaries of products
liability law by developing an ideology of consumer powerlessness. As
Prosser's insistently gendered references suggest, by the postwar era the
buyer's descent from autonomy to dependency increasingly became
linked to women in terms of their more marginalized cultural status.
V. WOMAN AS CONSUMER/CONSUMER AS WOMAN IN THE
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Faced with the liability-limiting rules that had evolved under the
social and economic conditions of an earlier era, courts that were so
inclined could apply the incremental techniques of common-law
adjudication to moderate the rigor of existing rules. At times, courts
interpreted language in the Sales of Goods law to rule that particular
statements made to promote the sale of a product qualified as express
or implied warranties. On other occasions they exploited the ambiguities
of contractual language to invalidate questionable disclaimers of lia-
bility. Case-by-case approaches benefited particular consumers on whose
behalf these rulings were decided but had limited precedential value. To
achieve more sweeping change, courts had to be willing to break with
precedent. Given the reactive nature of the adjudicative process, courts
had to seek out, or create, occasions to exercise jurisdiction.
141 Prosser, supra note 121, at 1128.
142 Id. at 1133.
141 Id. at 1123-1129; 1133-1134.
1" Llewellyn, supra note 118, at 739.
141 See text accompanying supra note 133.
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The affirmative reaching out for cases whose decision could advance
a law-reform agenda is a marker ofjudicial activism. As an approach to
adjudication, activism entails the acceptance of the proposition that
lawmaking is within the scope of judicial authority. Branded as anti-
democratic in the sense that a (typically) unelected appellate judiciary
takes on functions usually exercised by a legislature, judicial activism
in the postwar era became an even more controversial practice because
of the then more generalized concern about threats to democratic
structures. Measured against Cold War sensibilities, judicial activism's
ostensible retreat from democratic principles was cause for disquiet, if
not alarm, among both liberals and conservatives who favored"neoconstitutional" restraint upon the power of the state. 4' Still, during
this postwar period, shifting jurisprudential currents encouraged some
courts to resort more forthrightly to policy considerations in developing
legal doctrine. Most notably, the functionalist school, bearing the
imprint of legal realism, rejected a formalist approach to
adjudication-looking exclusively to statements of rules elucidated in
prior judicial opinions-in favor of greater attentiveness to the facts of a
case and the economic and social consequences of legal rules.147
After a state constitutional convention adopted an amendment in
1947 restructuring the New Jersey court system, the New Jersey
Supreme Court assumed a broad policymaking role which it has invoked
to prevent a rigidifying of legal doctrine.1" Under the shaping influence
of Chief Justices Arthur Vanderbilt and Joseph Weintraub during the
1950s and 1960s, the court acquired a reputation as an independent,
influential, and progressive bench.149 In three decisions handed down
between 1960 and 1965, the court reached out to review cases that
presented the opportunity to dismantle the armature of court-made
rules limiting the right to recover damages against manufacturers of
defective merchandise. In Henningsen and Schipper, the court took the
14 Kalman, supra note 10, at 154-155.
147 Id. at 221-224, 231.
14 Stanley H. Friedelbaum, JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS: A
DECADE OF CHANGE IN NEW JERSEY 6 (1990). The actual scope of cases that the court
reviews is limited; a few categories of cases are subject to obligatory review and the
balance of the court's jurisdiction is discretionary, administered through a certification
provision that restricts review of decisions of the intermediate appellate courts to special
circumstances. Id. at 8.
1' Henry Robert Glick & Kenneth N. Vines, Law Making in the State Judiciary: A
Comparative Study of the Judicial Role in Four States, 2 Polity 142, 148-149, 158 (1969).
See also Robert A. Kagan, et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 Mich. L. Rev.
961, 993 (1978)(noting frequency with which the New Jersey Supreme Court was cited
by out-of-state courts during 1940-1970 as an indicator of the court's influence).
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unusual step of bypassing the intermediate appellate court and
certifying the case to itself for review. In all three cases, the court used
the occasion of discretionary review to announce doctrinal change that
incorporated explicit social policy considerations. Yet if the supreme
court acted in functionalist fashion in these cases, responding to
changing social and economic conditions, I argue that these cases also
serve as deeply gendered cultural narratives of the postwar period.
Drawing on deconstructive approaches that unmask oppositional or
suppressed elements in texts that on their surface seem to cohere, 5 ° the
discussion that follows will consider the ways in which the court helped
to consolidate a legal category, constructing the consumer in feminized
terms that resonated with postwar discourses of suburban entropy,
conformity, and domesticity.
The Madwoman of Keansburg
On May 19, Helen Henningsen drove her new Plymouth car, a
Mother's Day gift from her husband, to Asbury Park. On the return trip
to her home in suburban Keansburg, the steering mechanism spun out
of control, the car swerved sharply to the right, and crashed into a brick
wall. The damage was so extensive that it was impossible to tell whether
the steering mechanism was defective prior to the impact. Helen and her
husband Claus Henningsen sued Chrysler and the dealer for damages
resulting from Helen's injuries and Claus's loss of consortium. After a
jury trial, the couple recovered against both defendants under the theory
that a disclaimer of liability provision in the sales documents was
ineffective, and that the manufacturer and dealer had breached an
implied warranty of merchantability.' 5 '
Affirming the trial court's judgment, Judge Francis's unanimous
opinion for the court held that under modem conditions of marketing,
when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and
promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is
reasonably suitable for use accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate
purchaser.'52 The court also held a disclaimer of liability void as a matter
of law, noting the purchaser's inequality of bargaining position vis-a-vis
the automobile industry.' Although the widespread practice of
interposing a putatively independent dealer between car manufacturers
"' Frug, supra note 43, at 118.
151 32 N.J. at 364-365.
152 Id. at 384.
153 Id. at 404.
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and the consuming public insulated manufacturers from liability under
the privity rule, the court concluded that neither Claus Henningsen's
lack of privity with Chrysler, nor Helen Henningsen's lack of privity
with Chrysler or the dealer, was a bar to their recovery of damages.154
The Henningsen ruling marked a significant movement in New
Jersey case law in favor of the consumer. To achieve this result, the
court analogized the question presented in the suit to a series of out-of-
state cases in which producers of injurious food and beverages were held
liable, in the absence of privity, under the warranty doctrine. Under the
circumstances, the Henningsen court saw "no rational doctrinal basis for
differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective
automobile." 55 Requiring the manufacturer to bear the burden of loss
was in society's interest because the manufacturer was in a position to
control the risk or equitably allocate losses when they occurred. At the
same time, because the manufacturer invested in mass advertising
strategies, the court understood that the manufacturer had recognized
and was addressing the "consumer"-an entity distinct from the
purchaser to the extent that the consumer encompassed any reasonably
foreseeable user of a product, whether or not the person participated in
its acquisition.156
Central to the court's reasoning was the concern that overbearing
marketing practices had disabled the purchaser from exercising
independent judgment and free will. Commenting on the variations in
size and legibility of typeface on the single-page sales contract, for
example, the court noted the small type in which the manufacturer's
warranty disclaimers on the back of the document had been cast. 157 (The
court emphasized that no one at the dealership had drawn Claus
Henningsen's attention to these provisions, which he admitted he did
not read. Mindful, perhaps, of The Organization Man's
uncomprehending husband, whose effort to read a sales contract offered
no illumination about its terms, the court did not mention Henningsen's
admission at trial (which Chrysler's appellate brief repeated) that he
routinely signed papers without reading them: "Put it in front of me and
I sign it.")158
Moreover, the manufacturer's use of mass-mediated sales promotion
techniques reinforced the risk that the consuming public would be
'5 Id. at 384, 415-416.
161 Id. at 383.
166 Id. at 379.
157 Id. at 365-368.
" Brief for Defendant, Chrysler Corporation as Cross-Respondent and Appellant,
Docket No. A-185-58, September, 1959, 3.
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unable to evaluate products on their merits. The court took judicial
notice of the fact that auto manufacturers underwrote large-scale
promotional efforts to persuade the public to buy their products.'5 9
Responding, perhaps, to the Henningsens' citation to The Hidden
Persuaders, which recorded the sizeable sums that major car
manufacturers were spending on advertising,"0 the court was persuaded
that manufacturers used the mass media to invite reliance on the
quality of their products (even if the named sponsor of the ad was a
national car dealer's association).' 6 ' Even as, and perhaps because,
advertising heralded the liberatory effects of consumerism, the court
remained skeptical of its claimed benefits. Rather, the court cited a
series of out-of-state opinions which drew attention to the effects of mass
advertising on the perceptions of consumers. These cases recognized how
consumers were targeted by mass marketing appeals, particularly those
involving the direct importuning of radio (which Herbert Schiller has
called the "most persuasive . . . salesman in the nation" before
television 62 ) and the powerful visual symbols featured on billboards. In
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,163 for example, a personal injury case alleging
defendant Ford Motor Company's failure to install an advertised
shatter-proof windshield, the court acknowledged changes in the way in
which manufacturers created demand for products:
Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast changes have
taken place in the economic structure of the English speaking peoples.
Methods of doing business have undergone a great transition. Radio,
bill boards and the products of the printing press have become the
means of creating a large part of the demand that causes goods to
depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to
recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods to create a
demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities
which they, in fact, do not possess; and then, because there is no privity
of contract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny
159 32 N.J. at 385.
1"0 Brieffor Plaintiffs Claus H. Henningsen and Helen Hennmingsen as Cross-Appellants,
Docket No. A -185-58, n. d., 15."' A popular example of that practice was the The Dinah Shore Show. Broadcast twice
weekly during 1953, the program was sponsored by the Chevrolet Dealers of America.
The text of the ad referred to the "Chevrolet dealer, the man who sells and services
America's first choice in cars and trucks." Museum of Television and Radio Archives, New
York, New York.
162 Herbert I. Schiller, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 25 (1971).
6 168 Wash. 456 (1932).
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the consumer the right to recover if damages result from the absence
of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.'
The Henningsen court drew similar support from Worley v. Proctor
& Gamble Manufacturing Co., e an opinion from the St. Louis Court of
Appeals which held that the co-owner of a restaurant who suffered from
a disabling skin irritation after using a popular detergent in her
business operations failed to sustain her burden of proof in an action
against the detergent manufacturer. Yet the court also recognized that
manufacturers' representations in advertising can rise to the level of a
warranty, even in the absence of a traditional contract with the ultimate
consumer:
Under modern conditions of retail merchandising, and the employment
of widespread advertising, representations are, in fact, made to the
consuming public. Thus, the legend "Tide is kind to your hands" is not
directed to the retail dealer-a mere conduit through which goods are
distributed to the consuming public-but to the housewife, who is
always solicitous of the condition of her hands. In such a situation, it
would be in keeping with the realities of modern economic life to
recognize the applicability of the principles of warranty as governing
in a contest between the ultimate consumer and the party making such
representations."'
At the same time that the Worley court used "modem realities" to
justify expanding the scope of a warranty, it relied on stereotypes of
women-as vain, as housewives, and as prototypical consumers-to give
content to warranty protection. In what would prove to be a recurrent
rhetorical strategy in the legal discourse of this period, the court
feminized the consumer by collapsing the "consuming public"-and the
individual business-owning plaintiff in the case-into the social category
of the housewife.
The Henningsen court also cited, without quoting, a decision from
the Ohio Supreme Court that sounded a similar theme of modernity and
evolutionary functionalism in a context in which a woman was the
injured consumer. Recognizing the emergence of "new conditions and
practices of our changing and progressing civilization," the court in
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,1"7 had ruled that the petition of the
plaintiff (a woman whose scalp had been burned after she used a home
hair wave) had met the legal requirements for stating a warranty claim
16 Id. at 462-463.
1 241 Mo. App. 1114, 1121 (1952).
166 Id. at 1121.
167 167 Ohio St. 144, 149 (1958).
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on the basis of the manufacturer's advertisements. In its supporting
rationale, the court went on to note the use of mass media, from
signboards to radio and television, in promotional campaigns pitched to
the ultimate consumer.1"
The court did quote from Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,1 69 a 1942
Texas Supreme Court case imposing warranty liability on a
manufacturer of unwholesome food, which underscored the concern,
even in a pretelevisual world, that advertising had the power to blunt
reasoning and sound judgment: "[A] modern manufacturer.. not only
processes the food and dresses it up so as to make it appear appetizing,
but he uses the newspapers, magazines, billboards, 70 and the radio to
build up the psychology to buy and consume his products. The invitation
extended by him is not only to the housewife... but to the members of
the family and guest to eat it.""' In the gendered terms of the Capps
court, the manufacturer (pronominally "he") succeeds who seduces the
housewife, both by the cosmetic appeal of packaging (here the product,
dressed up, is itself feminized) and by the inexorable power of a media-
saturating message. Hence the need in the Henningsen case to protect
the consumer through the judicial imposition of a warranty: "Under
modem marketing conditions, the ordinary layman, responding to the
importuning of colorful advertising, has neither the opportunity nor the
capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile for use;
he must rely on the manufacturer and to some degree on the dealer." 72
'6 Id. at 248-249.
"e 139 Tex. 609 (1942).
170 Complementing radio's importance as a promotional medium, by the late 1930s
billboards installed by the National Association of Manufacturers, a consortium of trade
groups, became ubiquitous across the U.S.; 20,000 billboards were put up in 1937 and an
additional 45,000 the following year, all bearing the legend "There's no way like the
American Way." Melding images of consumerism and (white) nuclear family values, the
national billboard initiative touted a world of free enterprise, high wages, and short
working hours. If these messages were mostly aspirational in the 1930s, the billboards
served as an important and pervasive medium through which corporate interests held out
the hope of prosperity and the pleasures of domesticity around the corner. Ewen, supra
note 65 at 320-321.
171 Id. at 619.
172 32 N.J. at 384. In the wake of Henningsen, other courts in the 1960s would take
account of the effects of mass advertising by drawing on general cultural experience with
television. Just a year after Henningsen was decided, the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710 (1961), registered its concern for the helpless, media-
dazed consumer (whose gender shifts from male to female in the space of a sentence),
holding that an injured plaintiff could proceed with a suit against the manufacturer of a
household cleaning agent when she was induced to buy the product on the strength of
advertising:
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The reference in Henningsen to the consumer as "ordinary layman"
does not suggest a retreat from the gender formulations in Capps. In
fact, even if nominally male, the consumer in Henningsen is an
unprepossessing specimen under traditional gender ideology, a man who
not only is run-of-the-mill but is presumably passive and culturally
feminized, a "lay" man. Nor does the passing reference to the consumer
The supermarkets and other retail outlets of our day dispense with the need for
clerks behind counters to wait on customers. The goods are displayed on shelves
and counters lining the aisles, and the customer, as he searches for a product, is
bewitched, bewildered, and bedeviled by the glittering packaging in riotous color
and the alluring enticement of the products' qualities as depicted on labels. The
item selected is apt to be the one which was so glowingly described by a glamorous
television artist on the housewife's favorite program just preceding the shopping
trip. Or the media of advertising might have been radio, magazine, billboard or
newspaper. All are widely used in the appeal directed to the ultimate consumer.
148 Conn. at 717-718 (italics added). Recalling Packard's accounts of the supermarket
"impulse buying" studies, the explicitness of the Hamon court's concern about the effects
of media on consumer decision making surfaced in cases involving a range of legal issues.
See, e.g., Jerry Finn v. Cooper's Inc., 292 F. 2d 555 (1961)(recognizing the visual power
of trademarks, and the efficacy of television advertising to impress the consciousness of
passive consumers, whose minds were blank screens upon which manufacturers' visual
images could be projected):
[We must consider the visual impact of the marks on the minds of the prospective
purchasers who view them. Such symbols are readily recognized by both literate
and illiterate prospective purchasers and are as readily associated with particular
goods by children as it is [sic] by adults.... Symbolic marks speak a universal
language; they lend themselves to effective display in advertising and sales
promotional activity and can thus become the dominant part of the mark on labels,
packages, and point of purchase displays. They can catch the eye of the customer
and create a lasting general impression. Current mass advertising media utilize
symbols which are visually projected into millions of homes of prospective
purchasers by television and these symbols frequently are associated with pictures
of the goods of a particular user.
292 F.2d at 1136. In a case ordering the General Foods Corporation to divest itself of its
holdings in a steel wool soap pad company because it had substantially lessened
competition in that soap pad market, the U.S. Court of Appeals similarly emphasized the
marketer's efforts to capture the mind of the consumer par excellence-the housewife.
Assigning most of its spending on sales promotion to television advertising, "[G.] F.
endeavors to create a desire for a particular product in the mind of the shopper, thereby
enabling her to make a distinction among the different brands of a similar commodity. It
is 'an unrelenting effort to presell the housewife.' (italics added). General Foods Corp. v.
FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 938 (3rd Cir. 1967). That same year, when the U.S. Court of Appeals
held that the television marketing of Geritol (for"iron poor blood") was misleading under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, it noted the powerful effect of mass media's "highly
developed arts of persuasion" on the ability of the "typical" consumer to "make an
intelligent choice," and appended the text of several ads, featuring Geritol's most famous
pitchman, Ted Mack, to reinforce its point. J.B. Williams Co. Inc. and Parkson
Advertising Agency Inc. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967).
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as male alter the fact that it is Helen Henningsen-a mother-who
literally drives the litigation. Consistent with stereotypes that deny
women's decision making capacity, Henningsen is portrayed as a legal
non-entity, not a party to the sales contract; nor, apparently, does she
have a public identity separate from her role as wife and mother. From
the opinion she does not appear to be engaged in any productive labor,
domestic or otherwise. All that we know is that she has driven down to
Asbury Park, the famed seaside resort, presumably for a day of leisure.
The appellate brief submitted on the Henningsens' behalf offers a
more nuanced narrative, though it reinforces in some respects the notion
of Helen Henningsen as a non-entity. One of the six questions for appeal
asks whether a "woman, who participated in the purchase of a vehicle,
and was the person for whom the vehicle was purchased, may recover
for a breach of implied warranty even though the vehicle was purchased
in the name of her husband?""3 The Statement of Facts attests that
Helen was so thrilled to have a new car (a "Plymouth all [her] own"?)' 74-
the first new vehicle the couple had purchased in their 17 years of
marriage-that she "was running around like a madwoman."17 Yet we
also learn that her trip to Asbury Park was business-related; she had
driven down to put a deposit on a summer food stand. From a section of
the brief relating to her lost earning capacity we discover that she and
her husband had worked as co-partners in a restaurant business and
that she had been employed outside the home for 25 years.176 She was,
in fact, one among the 40% of postwar American women so employed,1 77
the cult of domesticity notwithstanding. Though it is tempting to argue
that the court has deliberately suppressed a subversive cultural detail,
commentators in the lawyering theory tradition would suggest that the
court acted unconsciously, falling back on a form of cultural cognitive
dissonance in which the power of "proverbial models," 7 ' based on
cultural stereotypes, overwhelmed inconsistent facts. 179 For all its good
intentions, the court exhibits stereotypical thinking about women's
domesticity and incapacity in its portrayal of Helen Henningsen.
As George Lakoffs work in cognitive linguistics has shown,
stereotypes express cultural expectations. They are metonymic in the
173 See supra note 102, at 1.
171 See supra note 54.
175 See supra note 102, at 2.
176 See supra note 102, at 43-44.
'7 May, Homeward Bound, supra note 6 at 84.
178 Davis, supra note 30, at 11.
179 See id. at 16; Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 55, 104-110, 112, 117-118 (1992).
Vol. 27
2003 The Postwar Consumer as Feminized Legal Subject 255
sense that they correspond to a subcategory that stands in for a larger
conceptual category. And they facilitate the mental work of drawing
conclusions, though always at the expense of critical analysis."8 Writing
specifically about gender stereotypes, Lakoff has shown that, in U.S.
culture, the housewife-mother has been considered to be a better
example of the category"mother"-a prototype-than mothers who are not
housewives-thus the need to add the modifier "working" mother to
differentiate her from the housewife- mother, the unmarked category. 181
In Henningsen, the omission of facts relating to Helen Henningsen's
employment history demonstrates the way in which the court viewed the
housewife-mother as the norm for women's experience; the court's
omission is a silence that speaks. The portrait of Helen that emerges in
the opinion is based on a stereotype of an innocuous stay-at-home
mother who ultimately loses control. Even more telling is the appellate
briefs use of her testimony, invoking the stereotype of the irrational
woman. It is impossible to tell whether the statement had been uttered
spontaneously, rupturing the surface of her trial narrative (what
literary scholar Priscilla Wald might see as a lapse, or verbal slip,
expressing the tensions and paradoxes of Henningsen's own cultural
position).'82 Assuming that it was, Henningsen's lawyers were
sufficiently taken with it to inscribe it in the briefs Statement of Facts,
presumably because it seemed to augur well as a litigation theory (on
the premise that portraying Henningsen as irrational or irresponsible
would suggest to the court the "need" to intervene on behalf of feminized
consumers-men and women-in increasingly complex transactions). Yet
it is equally likely that her lawyers included the statement
unconsciously,18 responding to a powerful cultural stereotype which,
over time, acquired a plausibility, a seeming naturalness, that foreclosed
further consideration of its use. As the Henningsen court effectively
silenced a narrative that would have placed Helen Henningsen outside
the cultural "norm," Helen Henningsen's lawyers published a narrative
detail in the appellate brief that drew on another culturally embedded
story about gender. The effect was the same in both: gender details from
the litigation plotline reinforced the position of the woman as disem-
powered consumer.
18 George Lakoff, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND 79, 85 (1980).
181 Id. at 80.
182 Priscilla Wald, CONSTITUIrNGAMERICANS: CULTURALANXIETYAND NARRATIVE FORM
1, 4, 6 (1995). See also Frug, supra note 43, at 114.
18 Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 179, at 117-118.
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The Bad Mother
In a tract home designed and built by the Levitt organization in
Willingboro, New Jersey, 16-month-old Larry Schipper was badly
scalded by hot water running from the bathroom faucet. Larry's parents
were leasing the home from another family, the Kreitzers, who had
purchased it two years earlier from Levitt. Having been burned
themselves on several occasions, the Kreitzers were aware that the
water from the bathroom spigots was excessively hot-and posted a note
warning users of the unusual condition. The Levitt organization had
designed the home's gas-fired heating unit to draw on the same water
source for heating and domestic purposes. The Homeowner's Guide
pointed out that the house was equipped with mixing-type spigots to
allow users to adjust the water temperature. The instructions simply
directed users to turn on the cold water tap first, then the hot water, to
avoid "wasting hot water and [to yield] properly tempered water for
bathing and dishwashing." The Schippers discovered the problem by
personal observation on the day they moved in, two days before their
toddler was burned."M
Reversing a trial court decision that had dismissed the Schipper
lawsuit, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that buyers (and other
foreseeable users) of a mass-produced development home could hold the
manufacturer accountable not only under negligence principles but
under the expanding parameters of implied-warranty doctrine (treated
by the court as the equivalent of the tort doctrine of strict liability).185
Specifically, the court ruled that Levitt's deliberate design of the heating
units for the New Jersey homes without a mixing valve-a relatively
inexpensive water-tempering device that would have avoided the resort
to combination spigots-created a basis for liability under both
negligence and warranty theories. (In a pointed reference to Levitt's
discriminatory design decisions, the court referred to trial testimony
indicating that none of the 20,000 New Jersey and Pennsylvania
Levittown houses contained mixing valves, although the presumably
more expensive Long Island units did.)" 6 The court rejected "ancient
distinctions" that no longer met the needs of a technologically advancing
society, and invoked functionalist principles of adaptation to jettison the
existing rules: "The law should be based on current concepts of what is
'84 44 N.J. at 74-76.185 Id. at 80,90-91.
1 Id. at 79.
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right and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times."18 7
Drawing heavily on Henningsen's rationale, the court extended the
warranty doctrine to sales of newly constructed homes that were
marketed on the basis of advertised models. In a sympathetic opinion,
Judge Jacobs repeatedly invoked the role of "[1]aw as an instrument of
justice"-its ability to adapt to "changing needs and mores ."'1 The court
emphasized that contemporary consumers were not on an equal footing
with builders and no more able to protect themselves against the risk of
injury from design defects than auto purchasers had been.18 9 At the
same time, the court focused closely on the facts of the case, writing
against a sinister narrative developed in Levitt's brief. In its Statement
of Facts, the Levitt organization reported that the injured toddler"apparently climbed, or was placed, into a downstairs powder room
basin and the hot water was turned on.. . the child could not have
reached the faucets without being lifted up or climbing up on something
... it also appears that the accident could have been avoided by simply
keeping the powder room door closed.""9
The implication of blame is unmistakable. The accident occurred on
a weekday when the record showed that Lawrence Schipper was at
work, leaving his wife Patricia Schipper home to care for their son. But,
Levitt argued, Patricia Schipper was a classic bad mother (and, Levitt's
counsel might have added, the antithesis of the reserve army of good
mothers celebrated on Queen for a Day). If, as Martha Fineman has
argued, the cultural construction of mother as "heterosexual, married,
chaste, and self-sacrificing" is "statistically improbable" as well as"oppressive," it is this representation of motherhood that has long held
cultural purchase. This "common image of the ideal mother," Fineman
maintains, is the standard against which women with children are
routinely appraised. At the same time, the very closeness of the
culturally-defined mother-child connection is accompanied with an "aura
of danger."19' Although Freudians have famously linked that danger to
a mother's oppressive overprotectiveness, it is rather the risk created by
the seemingly neglectful or reckless mother that has had a particularly
187 Id. at 90.
'8 Id. at 89.
'89 Id. at 90-91.19 Brief for Respondent, Levitt & Sons, Inc., Docket No. A-719-63, September 1964, 3.
19' Martha Albertson Finemen, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTHETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 57, 72 (1995).
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powerful claim on the cultural imaginary, as Marie Ashe has shown. 92
In a similar vein, Paula Cooey has argued that the idealization of
motherhood in U.S. culture (in Peggy Cooper Davis's terms, the "fantasy
of the perfect and all powerful mother"' 93 ) has fueled an expectation of"nothing less than extraordinary mothers as normative."" Merely
ordinary mothers who cannot live up to the exalted ideal are much more
at risk of being identified as "bad."
The cultural trope of the neglectful mother is a crucial ingredient in
the Levitt organization's argument. Having failed to organize every
waking moment around her child, Patricia Schipper was, Levitt implied,
non-nurturing and neglectful. Rejecting this mother-as-monster
scenario, the court portrayed Mrs. Schipper as helpless bystander in the
way it framed her testimony: "she was upstairs when she heard Larry
crying. She came downstairs, heard the water running, found the hot
water faucet in the bathroom sink turned on, and realized that Larry
had been scalded. He was taken immediately to the doctor's office and
then to Cherry Hill hospital where he remained for seventy-four
days."'95 Rather than attributing agency to Patricia Schipper, the court's
use of the passive voice seemed to suggest that an unknown force had
turned on the faucet and scalded Larry. What was sinister was not the
mother's carelessness but the unaccountability of the accident. In this
scenario, Patricia Schipper was helpless rather than careless, powerless
to prevent the scalding that unvaryingly and unavoidably results when
water is drawn directly from the hot water spigot in a Levitt-designed
(no longer a child-friendly, one-story) unit. Thus, the court traded one
cultural stereotype for another, and, as in Henningsen, portrayed the
woman-as-consumer as weak and ineffectual, in need of the court's
protective intervention.
It is possible that the court deployed gender strategically here.
Casting Patricia Schipper as powerless would support an outcome that
imposed liability on the Levitt organization for her son's injuries. Yet
"2 Ashe notes that in Western legal and literary discourse the bad mother is one whose"neglectful, abusive, reckless, or even murderous behaviors threaten to destroy her
children." Marie Ashe, The Bad Mother in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representa-
tion, 43 Hastings L. J. 1017, 1019 (1992). See also Williams, supra note 45, at 1568, 1583.
"9' Cooper Davis, supra note 58 at 365-366. See generally Nancy Chodorow & Susan
Contratto, "The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother," in Barrie Thorne (ed.), RETHINKING THE
FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 191-214, at 191, 203 (1992).
"9 Paula M. Cooey, "'Ordinary Mother' as Oxymoron: The Collusion of Theology,
Theory, and Politics in the Undermining of Mothers," in Julia Hanigsberg & Sara
Ruddick (eds.), MOTHER TROUBLES 229-249, at 229 (1999).
'95 44 N.J. at 76.
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nothing in the opinion indicates that the court had deliberately chosen
this representational strategy. The ease with which the court could
imagine that Patricia Schipper was powerless to protect her son from
injury-or from the inexorable spread of Levittowns over the suburban
landscape of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania-is more
consistent with Peggy Cooper Davis's suggestion that culturally coded
stories tend to inform thinking at an unconscious level.'
The Seduction
In September, 1957, Daniel Santor had purchased 96-2/3 yards of
Gulistan carpeting, a nationally advertised brand, for his home. Almost
immediately after the carpet was installed, he observed a line in the
carpet that did not flatten out. After Santor made several unavailing
complaints to the carpet dealer, who in the interim had liquidated his
business, he learned for the first time that A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,
had manufactured the carpet. Santor asked to have it replaced but when
Karagheusian did not respond, Santor sued. Relying on the rule announ-
ced in Henningsen, the trial court rendered judgment against the manu-
facturer for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. 19 7 On
appeal, the appellate division reversed, holding that absent privity of
contract, the state recognized no cause of action for breach of warranty
for defective goods unless personal injury resulted from their use.
Defending its narrow reading of Henningsen, the appellate division
intoned in classically formalist terms that "our responsibility is to apply
the law as we find it to exist now." 98
Granting Santor's petition for certification and reversing the
appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an implied
warranty of merchantability applied to the sale of defective carpeting.
The court held that the plaintiff had the right to recover damages
against the manufacturer, even in the absence of privity and even
though no personal injury had resulted from the defect.' Alternatively,
following Judge Traynor's 1963 opinion, Greenman v. Yuba Power-
Products, Inc.,"2 from the California Supreme Court, the court grounded
recovery on the theory of strict liability in tort, which was not premised
on promotional advertising but rather on the "mere presence of the
196 See note 30, supra.
19 44 N.J. at 56-57.
'" 82 N.J. Super. 319, 322 (1964).
199 44 N.J. at 63.
2 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, (1962).
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product on the market."20' Here, the consumer's powerlessness was in
relation to the dangers hidden within the product itself.2 2
In Santor, the litigation personae did not lend themselves to a
"woman-as-consumer" plotline. Nonetheless, as Mary Joe Frug would
say, the "gendered overtones" are striking. Using language which, as
Frug has put it, "registers as sexual double entendre,"2 3 the court
invoked gender figuratively, as a mode of representing the consumer in
feminized and sexualized terms (the consumer-as-woman). The basis for
liability was the manufacturer's release of its defective product into the
marketplace, targeting persons who were "powerless" to protect
themselves:
The manufacturer is the father of the transaction. He makes the article
and puts it in the channels of trade for sale to the public.., the article
may pass through a series of hands . . . the dealer is simply a way
station, a conduit on its trip from manufacturer and consumer...
considerations ofjustice require a Court to interest itself in originating
causes and to apply the principle of implied warranty on that basis...
[even though] ... implied warranty had its gestative stirrings because
of the greater appeal of the personal injury claim [not property
damage] .24
Through metaphor, the court likened the marketing of the product to a
process of insemination in which the manufacturer, gendered as the
aggressive male, promotes the sale of the product through advertising,
as he seeks out women as passive receptacles (suggested in the"gestative stirrings") at the point of consumption.
The images in the seduction narrative are linked to stereotypes of
women's passive and vulnerable condition, and to a culturally embedded
sense of their irresponsibility, their need to be managed and controlled.
As Lea VanderVelde has shown with respect to the gendered origins of
the Lumley rule, images of women that comported with their less-than-
fully autonomous position in the workplace infiltrated legal reasoning
and discourse in cases permitting negative injunctions when performers
in the late nineteenth century-frequently actresses-sought to end a
performance engagement. Social constraints on women shaped the
development of a rule that covered male as well as women performers
who sought to be released from their contracts.2 5 Similarly in the Santor
201 44 N.J. at 66-67.
2m2 59 Cal.2d 57, 63-64 (1963).
2" Frug, supra note 43, at 113.
2m 44 N.J. at 59-60.
2' See VanderVelde, supra note 41, at 800-821, 828-830, 834.
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case, the court draws on tropes of women's sexual vulnerability and
passivity, then applies them more broadly in conceptualizing the
consumer's relation with the manufacturer. Though biologically male,
rhetorically the plaintiff Santor is gendered female, seduced and then
abandoned by the suitor-dealer, and rebuffed by the manufacturer-
father.
The Texas Supreme Court had used a more blatantly gendered
seduction narrative in the Capps case, cited earlier in the discussion of
Henningsen. In the same year the Capps case was decided, the United
States Supreme Court provided a model for this gendering and
sexualizing of the seller-buyer relation in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.' In that trademark infringement case, the
court noted the "psychological function of symbols," ascribing to
trademarks the power to "induce ... a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants."207 Anticipating
Packard's narrative of symbol manipulation, the court recognized that
the trademark owner "exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol." The aim "is to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears." (Emphasis added.)2" Like Henningsen, the
Court in Mishawaka refers to the male purchaser only to disaggregate
his stereotypically male attributes. As the trademark does its symbolic
work, it seeks out a feminized figure who passively waits, ripe for
impregnation by the entrepreneur-patriarch, active inseminator, and
agent of consumer desire. Though Santor does not cite to Mishawaka,
the two courts draw on widely circulating cultural tropes of gender
relations and sexuality in their strikingly similar representations of the
entrepreneur-buyer relation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Robert Gordon has shown in "Critical Legal Histories,"2 9
functionalist premises, for all their limitations,210 are deeply implicated
26 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
207 Id. at 205.
208 Id.
'o See supra note 11.
2 1 Though the functionalist method is evolving and adaptive, critics of this approach
have emphasized that functionalism can also lead to conformity, in the sense that it
promotes adjustment rather than sweeping change. Referring to its application to the
higher education of women in the 1950s, Betty Friedan has noted how it resulted in
unstimulating courses on the subject of preparing for marriage that were geared to the
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in legal discourse." At one level, as noted earlier, the New Jersey cases
can be read as functionalist responses to changing manufacturing and
marketing conditions.1 2 Recognizing that the interest of the consumer
is broader than that of a buyer, the New Jersey Supreme Court
broadened its rationale for imposing liability on the manufacturer-from
promotional advertising in Henningsen to the "mere presence of the
product on the market" in Santor21S-to sweep within its protective ambit
a broad swath of foreseeable users of products. However, in analyzing
these cases, this article has emphasized another level of meaning, and
an alternative explanatory framework for the progression of consumer
protection law. It has argued that postwar consumer protection doctrine
incorporated culturally embedded understandings of gender roles that,
in turn, were linked to anxieties about mass society and media. It has
traced the resonances of this doctrine with the broader culture by paying
close attention to the language inscribed in these legal texts-to
narrative structure, rhetorical choice, and use of metaphor.
The value of such a narrative-based, gender-focused reading is that
it illuminates an inescapable irony, and a cost, of the shift in the
ideology of the consumer. In representing the consumer as powerless,
the New Jersey Supreme Court conceptualized the consumer as a
woman, then projected widely held cultural assumptions about women's
dependency and incapacity onto the category of the consumer generally.
The court's reform of the legal rules around products liability, however
unwittingly, reinscribed "ancient doctrines" about gender and power
that have long been invoked to justify paternalistic laws, starting with
Bradwell v. State, which notoriously upheld an Illinois law banning
women from admission to the bar.214 Under the guise of protecting
same women who were discouraged from studying traditionally rigorous subjects: "There
is little or no intellectual challenge or discipline involved in merely learning to adjust."
Friedan, supra note 51, at 171.
211 Id. at 68, 109, 122.
212 Gordon might argue that, in the context of products liability doctrine, functionalist
legal discourse resulted in a set of "mandarin texts," in the sense that the pro-consumer
shift in the law was accomplished by elite policymakers rather than by grassroots
activism. At the same time, all three rulings from the New Jersey Supreme Court
preceded the active phase of the "third wave" of consumer activism that took hold in the
late 1960s, after President Kennedy announced a Consumer's Bill of Rights in 1962, and
which led to a groundswell of grassroots activism and governmental action in the late
1960s and early 1970s. See Mayer, supra note 76, at 27-29. In this sense, the New Jersey
Supreme Court proactively created a legal environment which was hospitable to the
consumer and prepared the way for more pervasive legal change.
213 32 N.J. at 384; 44 N.J. at 65.
214 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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women's sexual integrity and reproductive capacity, legislatures have
enacted protective measures-from the maximum-hours law upheld in
Muller v. Oregon215 to the restrictions barring women correction officers
from guarding male prisoners at issue in Dothard v. Rowlinson.216 How-
ever, unlike the legislation in these cases, which was predicated openly
on women's need for bodily protection, postwar consumer protection
doctrine operated more insidiously. Facially gender-neutral and liability-
enlarging, the developments in consumer protection doctrine which the
New Jersey Supreme Court spearheaded masked a narrative of tradi-
tional gender norms. It is this gendered narrative, built on the continued
plausibility of women's powerlessness, that, I argue, has explanatory
value when considering the shift in the law's conceptualization and
treatment of the consumer in the postwar era.
215 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
216 433 U.S. 321 (1977). For extended discussions of judicial treatment of protective
legislation, see Brown, et al., supra note 29, at 467-503. See generally Babcock, supra note
17.
263

